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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
BURGLARY-ENTY WITHOUT BREAKIG.-Defendant was charged with
the crime of burglary in the first degree for alleged aid as a lookout in the
burglarizing of a pool room which the principal entered during business
hours and through the front door. Held, this entry constituted burglary
under C. S. Idaho (1919) sec. 8400, providing that "every person who
enters any house, . . . with intent to commit grand or petit larceny, or
any other felony is guilty of burglary," if the intent was to commit larceny
within. State v. Bull (Idaho 1929), 276 Pac. 528.
The crime of burglary without the common law essential of breaking
exists in a number of jurisdictions where the crime has been materially
broadened through statutory enactments which define it as the entering
of any house with intent to commit a felony. At common law an entry
through an open door, window, or other aperture was not enough, unless
the entry was effected under such circumstances that there was a con-
structive breaking. 9 C. J. 1010.
In California under a statute similar to that of Idaho, where defend-
ants entered a store with intent to commit larceny it was immaterial that
the act of entering was not of itself trespass, but was during business
hours. People v. Brittain (1904), 142 Cal. 8, 75 Pac. 314; People V.
Desechenean (1921), 27 Colo. App. 285, 149 Pac. 802. An invitation to enter
for lawful purposes is not an invitation to enter for an unlawful purpose
and burglary may be predicated upon such an entry. McCreary v, State
(1923), 25 Ariz. 1, 212 Pact 336; People v. Barry (1892), 94 Cal. 481, 29
Pac. 1026.
It has been held that where a statute reads "break" or "enter" rather
than "break" and "enter," that entering alone is sufficient to constitute the
crime. State v. Vierk (1909), 23 S. D. 166, 120 N. W. 1098. See contra,
State v. Stephens (1922), 150 La. 943, 91 So. 349. And in Arkansas under
statutes defining burglary as an unlawful entry in the nighttime with
intent to commit a felony, it has been held that one who enters with intent
to commit a felony is guilty of burglary, although there was no breaking,
either actual or constructive. Pinson v. State (1909), 91 Ark. 434, 121
S. W. 751. See also, State v. Hall (1914), 168 Iowa 221, 150 N. W. 97.
According to the statutes of Oregon and Wisconsin every unlawful entry
of a dwelling house in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony therein
will be deemed a breaking and entering of said dwelling house within the
meaning of the statute defining burglary, but an inferior degree of the of-
fense. State v. Huntley (1894), 25 Ore. 349, 35 Pac. 1065; Nichols V. State
(1887), 68 Wis. 416, 32 N. W. 543.
In support of a view opposed to the Idaho ruling a Montana court, under
a statute identical with those of Idaho and California, held that in order
to constitute a burglarious entry, the act of entering must of itself be a
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trespass-an intrusion into the premises without the consent of the owner.
State v. Mesh (1907), 36 Mont. 168, 92 Pac. 459; see also People v. Kelly
(1916), 274 fI1. 556, 113 N. E. 926; State v. Moore (1841), 12 N. H. 42;
State v. Newbegin (1846), 25 Me. 502, has been cited in support of the
contrary view. It should be noted, however, that the Maine statute re-
quires both a breaking and entry to constitute burglary.
The intention of the legislatures in defining the offense of burglary was
to abolish the technical distinctions between acts that do not differ essentially
in point of criminality. It seems that the decision in State v. Bull is in
line with this development. E. S., '31.
Cs-Lms-UmrrY oN FoRGED BILL OF LADING ISSUED BY AGENT.-An
employee of a railway company went to a bank in a different state from
that in which he worked and under an assumed name forged a draft on
plaintiff cotton company and a bill of lading calling for 110 bales of cot-
ton. No cotton was ever delivered for shipment. The employee, in his
capacity as such, informed plaintiff that the cotton had arrived. Relying
on this assurance the plaintiff paid the draft. Held, defendant railway
company is liable for the amount so paid on the ground that the employee
had authority to notify persons in the position of plaintiff of the arrival
or nonarrival of merchandise. Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co.
(1929), 49 S. Ct. 160.
By the early English rule the carrier was not liable on bills of lading
issued by a servant when the goods had not been received, on the theory
that the servant had not acted within the scope of his authority. Berkley
v. Watling (1832), 7 A. & E. 29; Grant v. Norway (1852), 10 C. B. 665; Hub-
bersty v. Ward (1853), 8 Ex. 330. However, shortly after the leading case
of Grant v. Norway, supra, was decided the English Bills of Lading Act
(1855) made every bill of lading in the hands of a consignee or indorsee
for valuable consideration conclusive evidence of the shipment of such
goods as it represented, against the person signing it.
The Federal courts also held early that the taker assumes the risk of
the apparent authority of the servant to issue the bill of lading. Schooner
Freeman v. Buckinham et al. (1855), 18 How. 182. A line of cases held
that if no goods were actually delivered, the carrier could not be held liable.
Pollard v. Vinton (1881), 105 U. S. 7; Iron Mountain R. R. Co. v. Knight
(1887), 122 U. S. 79; Friedlander v. Texas and Pacific Railway Co. (1888),
130 U. S. 416; Missouri Pacific Railway v. McFadden (1894), 154 U. S.
155. Many of the state courts followed the same rule. Louisville & Nash-
ville Ry. Co. v. Nat. Park Bank (1914), 188 Ala. 109, 65 So. 1003; St. Louis
I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Citizens' Bank (1908), 87 Ark. 26, 112 S. W. 154.
Other state courts, however, held the carrier liable on the ground of estop-
pel. Bank of Batavia v. N. Y. L. E. & W. Ry. Co. (1887), 106 N. Y. 195,
12 N. E. 433; Brooke v. N. Y'. L. E. & W. Ry. Co. (1885), 108 Pa. 529, 1
Atl. 206; M. K & T. Ry. Co. v. Sealy et al. (1908), 78 Kan. 758, 99 Pac.
230. As a result of the desire to emerge from the hopeless conflict on this
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